When Safe Harbour Sinks: Court Rejects Safe Harbour Defence Claim in Baretail Chadstone Pty Ltd (ACN 161 755 460) (In Liquidation) v Kim Hoa Dai & Anor [2026] VSC 743

Jennifer Ball
20 Nov 2026
3 minutes

In Baretail Chadstone Pty Ltd (ACN 161 755 460) (In Liquidation) v Kim Hoa Dai & Anor, the Supreme Court of Victoria considered whether a company was insolvent where there were offers of unlimited supplier credit, and whether the statutory defences available to a director, including the safe harbour defence under s 588GA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), applied. 

Background

Baretail Chadstone Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Company) and its Liquidator sought compensation, amongst other things, under s 588M of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) from Ms Kim Hoa Dai (Ms Dai) in respect of a claim for insolvent trading during the period from 1 January 2021 to 21 June 2023 (Relevant Period), in the sum of $686,889.63.

The Company was incorporated in 2012 by Ms Dai, who was its sole director. In 2014, the Company entered into a sale agreement with her son's company Bariano Pty Ltd (as trustee for the Bariano Unit Trust) (Bariano), an importer of manufactured clothing from China, for the sale of part of its business comprising four retail stores and an e-commerce website for $200,000, with Ms Dai having lent the Company the $200,000 purchase price.

In July 2017, the ATO issued a default assessment to the Company for failure to lodge overdue BAS and tax returns for a total amount of $403,202.20 including GST and GST penalties.

From 2019 to around June 2021, the Company operated a number of retail stores, which were greatly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021. The Liquidator alleged that the Company traded while insolvent during the Relevant Period.

On 14 September 2022, the State Revenue Office issued a notice of assessment to the Company in respect of FY 22 for an amount of $55,220.71.

On 20 June 2023, the Commissioner of State Revenue filed an application to wind up the Company in insolvency under the Act.

On 21 June 2023, Ms Dai ceased to be a director of the Company.

On 9 August 2023, the Court made orders winding up the Company in insolvency and appointed the Liquidator.

Solvency considerations and 'third party support'

The Court accepted that the Company had incurred a debt to the ATO of $617,808.19 during the Relevant Period, which had grown to $1,228,944.25 by the date of the liquidation, and was satisfied that the SRO debt was correctly calculated by the Liquidator to be $68,589.28. The Court was also satisfied that Ms Dai was a director of the Company during the Relevant Period when it incurred debts of $617,808.19 and $68,589.28 (Relevant Debts).

The Court considered whether the Company was insolvent at the time the Relevant Debts were incurred. The Liquidator had used a start date of 1 January 2021, being the date on which the temporary COVID-19 safe harbour provisions enacted by the Commonwealth Government came to an end.

At [139] the Court set out the principles governing proof of solvency or insolvency and the relevance of third party support as previously set out in the judgment of Re Zerdest Pty Ltd [2026] VSC 491.

The test for insolvency under s 95A of the Act is whether a company is able to pay all its debts as and when they become due and payable. The Court accepted that, in assessing insolvency, it may have regard to the "commercial realities",1  which include moneys that might be available through an extension of credit or from an unsecured source.

In considering the support from any third parties, the Court reviewed a number of authorities and noted at [154]:

"It is important to have regard to the nature of the application that is before the Court. For example, some of the authorities concern a retrospective assessment of insolvency such as claims in respect of insolvent trading, whereas others concern prospective assessment of solvency, such as a defence to a winding-up application based upon a presumption of insolvency."

In a retrospective assessment of insolvency, the Court has the benefit of hindsight, whereas in a prospective assessment the Court must exercise foresight and consider whether funds that a third party is said to be willing to lend will in fact be available to assist the company to pay its debts. That willingness must be demonstrated, if not as a legal obligation, then as a matter of commercial reality.

Although there was evidence that Ms Dai's son was willing and able to provide 'unlimited credit' to the Company, would not enforce the debts owed by the Company and would continue to supply to it, there was no documentary waiver of the Company's legal obligation to pay debts due within 60 days of invoice under the written consignment agreement. The amount owed to companies associated with Ms Dai's son was $2,629,536.63. Overall, the Court found there was insufficient evidence to conclude that there had been an 'express or implied agreement between the company and the creditor for an extension of time stipulated for payment' or that 'there is a course of conduct between the company and the creditor sufficient to give rise to an estoppel preventing the creditor from relying upon the stipulated time for payment.'

Having considered the evidence, the Court did not accept that either Ms Dai or her son was willing or able to provide support, let alone unlimited support, to the Company. No documentary evidence was adduced to support the bare assertions of an ability to support the Company, save to the extent demonstrated by the related companies not calling for payment of amounts owed to them by the Company. The Court observed at [273]:

"It is important in a case where related parties claim, somewhat self-servingly, that they were prepared to support the company, to identify, from the objective evidence, whether such support was of a general nature or limited to a class of liabilities."

The Court found that there was no evidence that additional funds were available to the Company as either debt or equity, or through the realisation of the Company's assets, other than through ordinary trading.

Although the Court was not satisfied that the Liquidator had discharged his onus of proving that the Company was insolvent as at March 2021, the evidence demonstrated that, by July 2021 and at all times thereafter, there were no available resources from which to pay the whole or even a substantial part of the Company's liability to the ATO as and when it fell due. The Court did not regard Ms Dai's son or his companies as a source of funds from which such amount could be repaid. Similarly, it was not demonstrated that Ms Dai was such a source.

The Court concluded that the Company was insolvent during the period 1 July 2021 to 21 June 2023 (Revised Relevant Period).

Grounds to suspect insolvency and defences including safe harbour defence

The Court found that Ms Dai, or a reasonable person in her position, knew or would have known of the objective circumstances that constituted grounds for suspecting insolvency. For example, the Court pointed to the fact that she would have been aware of the ATO debt, that it had not been paid since 2020 and that there was no ready source of moneys from which to pay it. The Court was satisfied that, at the time the debts were incurred during the Revised Relevant Period, Ms Dai was aware that there were grounds for suspecting that the Company was insolvent.

Ms Dai sought to rely upon a number of statutory defences:

  1. s 588H(2) of the Act, namely that she had reasonable grounds to expect, and did expect, that the Company was solvent at the time and would remain solvent despite the debts incurred, because the Company continued to earn revenue and obtain supplies, and she had received advice from an accountant that the Company could meet its liabilities as and when they fell due.

  2. s 588H(3) of the Act, namely that she had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, that a competent and reliable person was responsible for providing her with adequate information about the Company's solvency and, on the basis of that information, expected that the Company was solvent at the time and would remain solvent despite incurring the debts.

  3. s 588GA of the Act, being the safe harbour defence, on the basis that, upon suspecting the insolvency of the Company, Ms Dai had developed a 'course of action' reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the Company.

  4. s 588GAAA of the Act, which provides that s 588G(2) does not apply if the debt is incurred in the ordinary course of business during the period 25 March 2020 to 31 December 2020 and before the appointment of an administrator, restructuring practitioner or liquidator.

In relation to the first defence, the Court rejected the claim that Ms Dai could or did rely upon the Company's accountant as a reasonable basis for her expectation that the Company was solvent, and was not satisfied that she had reasonable grounds to expect that the Company was solvent.

In relation to the second defence, the Court was not satisfied on Ms Dai's evidence that she had reasonable grounds to believe that a competent and reliable person was responsible for providing her with adequate information about whether the Company was solvent, and found there was no evidence that might be characterised as 'adequate information'.

The Court rejected Ms Dai's safe harbour defence, stating at [328]:

"Having regard to Ms Dai's failure to cause the Company to lodge the tax returns and the other deficiencies she has identified in the Xero accounts, it cannot be said that she properly informed herself of the Company's financial position; she did not seek any restructuring advice from an appropriately qualified person; further, she was not 'developing or implementing a plan for restructuring the company to improve its financial position'. While none of these matters are essential preconditions to the application of s 588GA of the Act, individually and collectively, they tell against the application of that provision."

Instead, the Court found that the matters identified by Ms Dai as evidence of her developing one or more courses of action reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the Company, were no more than ad hoc steps undertaken without reference to the Company's overall financial position or its solvency.

Further, the Court found that s 588GA(1) of the Act did not apply because, at the time the debts were incurred, the Company had failed to comply with its obligations under taxation laws, including its obligation to lodge tax returns for FY19, FY20 and FY21. Any suggestion by Ms Dai that there was a payment plan with the ATO was dismissed for lack of evidence. In addition to the ATO liability, the Company had significant payroll tax debts owed to the SRO, both of which are indicators of insolvency.

Finally, in relation to Ms Dai's defence under s 588GAAA, the Court accepted the Liquidator's evidence that the period of the claim had been reduced to exclude any debts incurred during the temporary safe harbour period, and concluded that s 588GAAA of the Act did not apply.

The Court's determination

Associate Justice Fary dismissed Ms Dai's claim for a set-off of $1.05 million under s 553C of the Act, determined that Ms Dai had contravened s 588G(2) of the Act in relation to the Company's incurring of the Relevant Debts and, having determined that the Company was insolvent from 1 July 2021, made orders under s 588M of the Act and determined at [336]:

"In the premises, the Liquidator may recover from Ms Dai, as a debt due to the Company, an amount equal to the amount of the loss or damage referred to above, which is $610,800.63."

Implications

There have been relatively few successful insolvent trading claims brought by liquidators in Australia since the early 1990s. Many such claims are presumably resolved before trial, while others may face obstacles such as a lack of assets available to liquidators to fund litigation.

For Directors

There are even fewer cases in which a director has relied upon the safe harbour defence, given the relatively recent introduction of the safe harbour provisions in 2017. As this case illustrates, it is not a 'box ticking' exercise. If a director suspects the company may become or is insolvent, the director cannot afford to take a passive approach. Drawing on the factors considered by the Court in this case, the director should take steps to:

  • ensure that the company is paying employee entitlements and meeting its taxation reporting obligations;

  • engage early with the risk of potential insolvency and seek appropriate advice from an appropriately qualified person;

  • properly inform themselves of the company’s financial position and monitor the debts being incurred;

  • develop or implement a clear plan for restructuring the company to improve its financial position;

  • ensure the company is keeping appropriate financial records consistent with the size and nature of the company;

  • ensure that the course of action (the turnaround plan) addresses operational, strategic and financial issues and the steps required to implement the plan; and

  • document the turnaround plan and regularly monitor the implementation of the plan to ensure that it remains reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company. If that proves not to be the case, then the plan needs to be modified or the director must act to place the company into administration or take steps to wind it up.

For Liquidators

It remains to be seen whether the safe harbour reforms will make it harder for liquidators to credibly threaten directors with insolvent trading claims.

What is clear, however, is that liquidators will need to scrutinise the conduct of directors more closely before commencing insolvent trading proceedings. Sections 1317S and 1318 of the Act are also relevant considerations for liquidators, as they give the court a discretion to relieve a director from liability for insolvent trading where, for example, the director obtained advice from a restructuring specialist with experience in the relevant industry and took active and genuine steps to resolve the company's financial problems.


[1] Southern Cross Interiors Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 53 NSWLR 213 (Palmer J) and Lewis v Doran (2004) 50 ACSR 175 (Palmer J) Back to article

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Clayton Utz communications are intended to provide commentary and general information. They should not be relied upon as legal advice. Formal legal advice should be sought in particular transactions or on matters of interest arising from this communication. Persons listed may not be admitted in all States and Territories.