Australia–India uranium deal: what it means for producers and investors

For Australian uranium producers and investors, this framework presents a unique opportunity to tap into India’s ambitious nuclear energy expansion, targeting 100 GW capacity by 2047. However, success will depend on negotiating offtake agreements, addressing India’s revised liability regime, and navigating Australia’s regulatory landscape. Producers should act early to secure export licences, assess counterparty risks, and monitor state-level policy changes to capitalise on this long-term growth opportunity.

Background: from cooperation agreement to administrative arrangement

The Agreement was signed in New Delhi on 5 September 2014 and entered into force in November 2015, establishing bilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for a term of 40 years with automatic 20-year renewals.[1] However, it did not itself authorise exports. The designated authorities (ASNO for Australia and the Nuclear Controls and Planning Wing of India’s Department of Atomic Energy) were required to finalise an Administrative Arrangement before trade could commence. That step has now been completed, more than a decade later. You can see some of our previous commentary on this matter here.

The key outstanding issue was the accounting and reporting of Australian-Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM) as it moves through the nuclear fuel cycle. The Administrative Arrangement establishes a government-to-government framework that puts in place reporting procedures and protocols to satisfy both sides regarding "the supply, the handling, and the accounting and reporting of" AONM. 

The commercial opportunity: quantities, timelines and commercial terms

No details have been provided regarding how much uranium will be sold, at what price, or when exports will commence. The Agreement is a government-to-government framework containing rather than a commercial framework so all commercial terms must be negotiated in separate offtake contracts with Indian counterparties.

India currently has 8.78 GW of installed nuclear capacity at the time of the Summit.[2] However, India’s ambitious target of 100 GW by 2047 will require roughly 18,000–20,000 tonnes[3] of uranium annually, significantly exceeding Australia’s current forecast export volume 6.7 kt for the 2025 to 2026 financial year.[4] The disparity is even more pronounced given that the vast majority of Australia’s current production is already committed under long-term contracts to existing customers, historically, around 80–85% of global uranium is transacted under long-term bilateral contracts (typically 3–15-year terms).[5] Australia’s existing export relationships with the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea and China mean that most of the 6.7 kt forecast is already committed, with little uncommitted volume available for prospective new markets. This highlights the substantial investment required to realise these long-term opportunities and the need for changes in policy in some jurisdictions to allow for the development of uranium mining in Australia. For context, Canada’s Cameco signed a deal in March 2026 to supply nearly 10,000 tonnes of U₃O₈ to India between 2027 and 2035, valued at approximately CAD 2.6 billion.[6]

Opportunities and challenges for Australian producers

Australia holds the world’s largest uranium reserves (approximately one-third of global resources), yet it is only the fourth-largest producer.[7] It currently has three operating mines, all in South Australia, being Boss Energy’s Honeymoon Mine, BHP’s Olympic Damand Heathgate Resources’ Four Mile Uranium Mine. South Australia holds approximately 83% of known reserves, and Port Adelaide is one of only two ports approved for uranium exports.[8]

The Agreement opens the door to long-term offtake agreements with Indian nuclear utilities. However, certain challenges remain. Exporting will require individual ASNO export licences for each shipment, lead times for establishing the contractual and compliance framework should not be underestimated, and India’s nuclear liability regime warrants careful attention in commercial negotiations.

India’s nuclear liability framework has recently changed. The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 2010 (CLNDA), which contained a controversial supplier recourse provision under section 17(b) extending liability to upstream suppliers for equipment or material defects, was repealed by the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy Act 2025 (SHANTI Act), which came into effect on 21 December 2025.[9] Under the SHANTI Act, recourse against suppliers is limited to a contractual right, with no statutory right of recourse except where a nuclear incident results from an intentional act. This brings India into closer alignment with global nuclear liability conventions and removes a key barrier that had deterred foreign suppliers from entering the Indian market.

Australia’s regulatory and licensing framework

Uranium producers in Australia operate within a multi-layered domestic regulatory framework. Key federal instruments include:

• Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 (Cth), requiring an ASNO export permit for each shipment;

• Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Cth), requiring a Permit to Possess Nuclear Material;

• Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (Cth), under which ARPANSA sets national radiation protection standards; and

• Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), which classifies uranium mining as a “nuclear action” requiring federal environmental assessment, typically taking several years from referral to approval.

State and Territory landscape

Uranium mining is currently permitted only in South Australia and the Northern Territory. The positions in each jurisdiction are summarised below.

Australia’s international non-proliferation obligations

India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates it holds between 90 and 110 nuclear weapons.[17]  Australia has obligations under the NPT and the Treaty of Rarotonga not to supply nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon states outside the NPT safeguards framework.[18]

However, the Administrative Arrangement that were agreed between India and Australia addresses  Australia's obligations  through several mechanisms, including the requirement that Indian civilian nuclear facilities are subject to IAEA safeguards, the Agreement requires all items to be used only for peaceful purposes, Australia retains prior consent rights over enrichment and reprocessing, and retransfer to any third state requires Australia’s prior written consent.

Practical considerations and next steps

The Agreement removes the single biggest procedural obstacle to Australia–India uranium trade. The administrative pathway is now open, however, the commercial landscape remains unclear. For companies in the Australian uranium sector, several considerations are material:

Export licensing. Each shipment requires a specific permit from ASNO. Producers should engage early to understand the process and documentation requirements for the India pathway.

Counterparty and liability risk. Offtake agreements should address the commercial gaps in the Agreement directly, including pricing, volume, force majeure and risk allocation. Although the SHANTI Act has removed the statutory right of recourse against suppliers, contractual recourse remains possible and well-drafted limitation of liability and indemnity protections should be included in any supply arrangements.

Regulatory and policy risk. The domestic landscape remains as relevant as the bilateral framework. Projects in South Australia and the Northern Territory are currently best positioned, however, legislative developments in the other states and territories should be monitored. With ongoing pressure on jurisdictions such as Western Australia to assist in the development of the uranium mining industry as part of the global decarbonising agenda for countries such as India, Japan and the United States.

Global demand for uranium continues to rise, driven by the energy transition and near record-high prices in early 2026. The Agreement positions Australia to participate in India’s substantial nuclear expansion.

Uranium producers and investors should monitor these changes carefully, including any amendments to state and territory legislative frameworks, to determine the opportunities for new and existing uranium projects and potential for private sector involvement.