Court-ordered action: How a mandatory injunction can be used to secure contractual performance

Mandatory injunctions are court orders that compel a party to take specific actions. They are much less common than the typical prohibitive injunction (which restrain a party from engaging in particular conduct).

In Bartter Enterprises Pty Limited v Darmad Pty Ltd ATF the Paul Webb Family Trust [2025] WASC 14, Clayton Utz successfully acted for Bartter in obtaining an urgent mandatory injunction. The case serves as a good illustration of when a mandatory injunction may be useful, as well as the hurdles that need to be overcome in order to obtain one.

Two hundred thousand chicks and no farm to raise them

Bartter Enterprises is a poultry producer, and Darmad owned a farm suitable for raising chickens.

The two made a contract under which Bartter delivered its chicks and Darmad was responsible for raising them until they reached maturity as fully grown chickens (at which point they were collected by Bartter).

This arrangement had continued for some time (and still had some time remaining in its term) when Darmad notified Bartter that it had sold the farm and it would not be accepting any more chicks. Unfortunately this was about a week before a set of over 200,000 eggs were due to hatch and be delivered to the farm.

Confronted with serious ramifications that would arise from a failure to accept placement of the chicks, Bartter approached the Court and urgently applied for an interlocutory mandatory injunction to force Darmad to comply with its contractual obligations (ie. to raise the chicks to maturity).

In this instance, an urgent interlocutory injunction was needed because there was no time for a trial to take place in the days before the eggs were expected to hatch, and Bartter was at risk of suffering irreversible damage, including to its reputation, if it had nowhere else to place the chicks at short notice.

What Bartter needed to establish to get an interlocutory mandatory injunction

There are two criteria that must be satisfied to obtain an interlocutory mandatory injunction.

1. Serious question to be tried

First, the applicant for the injunction must satisfy the Court that it has a "prima facie" case, which requires that there is a sufficient likelihood or probability of success to justify preserving the status quo until trial.

On this point, the Court considered it to be uncontentious that Darmad was about to breach its contractual obligations by refusing to accept delivery of the chicks, and was satisfied that Bartter had a strong prima facie case.

2. Balance of convenience

Secondly, the Court must weigh the inconvenience or prejudice that the applicant would experience if the injunction is not granted against the inconvenience or prejudice that the other party would suffer if an injunction is granted.

In carrying out that exercise in this case, the Court considered the following issues that would arise if no interlocutory mandatory injunction were made:

• Animal welfare, biosecurity and safety standards: It would not be viable or possible for Bartter to place all of the chicks at alternative farms in accordance with industry standards and safety procedures. If the chicks were not accepted it was likely they would have had to have been destroyed.

• Loss of profits: Bartter would suffer an immediate loss if it did not have anywhere to place the chicks to allow them to grow to maturity.

• Additional financial cost: Bartter had obligations to supply food items to its own customers in Western Australia, and it would have incurred an additional financial cost if it had to transport those items from its interstate facilities to meet those obligations.

• KPI requirements: Bartter would be exposed to the risk of defaulting on its key performance indicator requirements under its customer contracts.

The Court also considered the following matters that would be relevant if an injunction was ordered and Darmad was compelled to comply with the contract:

• Adequacy of damages (ie. financial compensation): Darmad argued that if it failed to accept the chicks, then a financial payment to Bartter would be an adequate remedy (and there would be no need for an injunction). The Court accepted that some aspects of the damage were quantifiable and could be compensated by a monetary payment (such as the loss of profit per chick), however it would be very difficult to calculate other aspects such as reputational harm that would follow if Bartter was unable to supply its own customers.

• Personal services: Even though Darmad was a company, if an injunction was granted, it would require elements of personal services, effort and exertion by its directors. Courts are generally reluctant to force people to do this, which weighed against a grant of a mandatory injunction.

• Court supervision: A mandatory injunction could lead to the undesirable possibility of the Court having to carry out continuous supervision of Darmad's conduct to ensure compliance. Again, this is another concern that can contribute to a Court's reluctance to grant a mandatory injunction.

• Practical difficulties: Due to time and financial constraints, Darmad argued that it would be impossible to prepare the farm and its sheds within the short timeframe to accept deliveries of the chicks. However, these issues were overcome by Bartter indicating that it could slightly delay delivery to give adequate time to allow Darmad to prepare.

• Alternative arrangements: Darmad pointed to the size of Bartter's business and resources to make alternative arrangements. The Court noted this was not a normally considered factor as to whether or not a contract should be performed. Still, Bartter did indicate that it was able to have 50,700 chicks placed at a different farm, and accordingly, the Court excluded those chicks from the scope of the injunction.

Ultimately, the Court found the balance of convenience was in favour of Bartter and granted the mandatory injunction sought, requiring Darmad to accept 174,600 of the incoming chicks and raise them to maturity.

The Court observed it was an "inescapable conclusion" that Darmad was the author of its predicament by preferencing its own commercial interests to sell its farm above its obligation to perform the contract.